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The European System of Governance and the Eastern  
Enlargement 
 
CARLOS DE CUETO NOGUERAS* 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Granada, Spain 
Abstract: Although it is important to eliminate the illegitimatising undemocratic 
heritage of the European institutional framework, any attempt to use the institutional 
reformist process as a means to delay the eastern widening of the European Union 
could endanger not only the democratic consolidation of the Central and Eastern 
European societies, but also the security and stability of the continent. Moreover, 
what it is more worrying, it could jeopardise the unity of the European integrationist 
project, as countries such as Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Finland lose interest 
in building Europe in favour of a greater bilateralism in their relationships with their 
Eastern neighbours. 
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1. The European Union: An International Organisation or a Supranational Entity 
Though the European Union is considered as a supranational organisation, it was created 
with the structures and task assignments of a traditional international body. However, 
after the approval of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), its supranational elements are 
now approaching a quantity which suggests that it has already obtained the quality of a 
federal body in large parts of its substance. Between 1945 and 1955, the European feder-
alist movement, led by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, constituted an important coali-
tion which pushed the issue of European integration to the forefront of political agendas. 
Throughout Western Europe, the integration was supported in the belief that the estab-
lishment of a federal European government would end the long-established pattern of 
wars between European, sovereign nation-states. Consequently, after the Second World 
War, Western Europe underwent a remarkable institutional transformation from a collec-
tion of divided nation-states to a partially amalgamated community for pragmatic politi-
cal and economic reasons. Since 1957, the institutional framework and policy competence 
of the European Community has gradually been consolidated and extended beyond the 
provisions of the original treaties thanks mainly to two events: the approval in 1986 of the 
Single European Act (SEA), and in 1992 of the Treaty on European Union. With both 
events, there has been the creation of a unique European system of governance which 
now embraces citizenship and monetary union, so empirically it is beyond dispute that the 
European Union level is now where a high proportion of what used to be regarded as 
purely domestic policy-making takes place. The locus of power and decision has shifted. 
Hence, even if the European Community was born as a peculiar form of international 
organisation, the peculiarities of its unique institutional structure and its unprecedented 
law-making and judicial powers make it seem more like a federal state, that is, a suprana-
tional entity where national governments undoubtedly play an important and crucial role 
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in the process of regional integration. The achievements of the European Community 
have, in practice, strengthened rather than weakened the nation-state, as the successes of 
the functionalist approach have been associated with a weakening rather than a strength-
ening of the vision of a politically united Europe. Moreover, if in legal terms, the member 
states have lost part of their national sovereignty in joining, in terms of political reality, 
they have become potentially much stronger, as the Community was in practice built 
upon those nation-states that some say it was intended to replace. 
From the very beginning of the European project there has been a continuous de-
bate between the integrationist and the inter-governmentalist methods. The first method is 
exemplified by those who argue that there has been a real loss of power of the member 
states to Community institutions, that is, a transfer of powers from the national to the EU 
level in a zero-sum fashion, due to the existence of some kind of co-operative federalism 
that typifies the decision-making of the European Union. A process of decision-making 
characterised by a cumulative pattern of accommodation, in which the participants refrain 
from unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by means of 
compromises that upgrade common interests. The second, inter-governmental method, is 
defended by those who argue that the member states have used the Community frame-
work as an instrument to enhance their interests and where the national component in EU 
decision-making is still vital and preponderant based on a pooling of sovereignties struc-
ture, like in the activities of most international organisations where the nation-state is the 
main political unit. 
The European Union in its present shape is neither a conventional international or-
ganisation nor an emerging state based on co-operative federalism, but a new system of 
governance. It is an unprecedented form of institutional innovation used to serve certain 
national and Community interests, involving the interaction of a political process de-
scribed by the supranationalism tendency and a pooling of sovereignties framework al-
ways resting on a set of inter-governmental deals. It is a halfway-house between 
confederacy and federation, a strange hybrid where there co-exists an inter-governmental 
decision-making process, with a supranational normative law in certain areas of Commu-
nity competence. Nevertheless, this mixed system of a compromised balance of national 
and Community level competencies, which can be found in Monnet’s and Schuman’s 
policy-making model for Europe, has been the result of a distribution shift of powers 
between these two levels of government. The resulting process shows that the European 
model is one based on concurrent jurisdiction where the institutions of both levels, supra-
national and intergovernmental, are deeply engaged in joint tasks, joint sharing of compe-
tencies, and participate in shared problem-solving exercises. Under this unique scenario 
the European Council is the key forum, as it addresses the sovereignty versus inter-
dependence dilemma by co-operative federal means. 
It is a mixed, unique system of policy-making cohabitation, where each element 
has become essential to the survival of the other, but has created a hyper-complex struc-
ture of policy-making encompassing a much wider range of public and private policy 
actors. A unique and flexible system of governance, more tightly organised than a typical 
international organisation, one which accumulates new functions from time to time, as 
judged to be necessary by its member states. It is a system that will likely promote the 
processes by which its supranational-integrationist approach will prevail to the detriment 
of the eroding of national autonomy and the inter-governmental method, since EU policy-
making is a collective exercise involving large numbers of participants, often in intermit-
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tent and unpredictable relationships, and given the difficulty in maintaining stable na-
tional coalitions. This is one idea that seems to be reinforced in the major amendments to 
the Treaty of Rome, the Single European Act and the treaties of Maastricht and Amster-
dam, since they avoid overall constitutional matters and are concentrated on the elabora-
tion of concrete programmes of joint action by member states in specific economic and 
social areas increasing co-operation and harmonisation. In this respect, we must under-
stand the institutional structure of the Union, as a specific set of institutions optimal for 
outlining these programs: the Commission to ensure that the programs that they have 
mapped out and agreed to follow are in fact implemented; the Court to ensure the legality 
of the process; and the European Parliament (EP) to ensure that it is in some sense de-
mocratically supervised. It is a pragmatic, flexible and problem-oriented functional type 
of government focused at those points within and beyond national or state boundaries 
where needs converge, but always based on a messy compromise between the federalist 
model of Europe and the intergovernmental co-operation approach. To prove this, we can 
turn to the innovations of the TEU. It can be stated that TEU marked yet another step in 
the process of strengthening the federal-constitutional spirit of European integration, 
bringing agreement on the European Monetary Union timetable, establishing an institu-
tional framework for foreign policy and defence co-operation, introducing the concept of 
European citizenship, laying down a fundamental constituent act with article A stressing 
“By this Treaty the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves an European 
Union”, extending the fields covered by qualified majority voting, creating the co-
decision procedure to reinforce the European Parliament’s legislative role, introducing the 
Committee of the Regions to represent local and regional authorities in EU decision-
making, increasing the competencies of the Community in fields such as education, voca-
tional training, youth, social policy, public health, consumer protection, environment, 
research and technology, and trans-European networks, and reinforcing the power from 
below with the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity. But at the same time, even 
after this constitutional revision, the intergovernmentalist co-operation model rests intact 
with the formal recognition of the second and third pillar ruled by inter-governmental 
methods: justice and home affairs and common foreign and security affairs, and with the 
establishment, for the very first time, of opt-outs for the United Kingdom and Denmark in 
certain fields. 
2. The Democratic Deficit in the European Institutional Structure 
The European Union is a genuine public power structure in such a way that European 
citizens are directly subject, at least at two governmental levels, Community and state. A 
Euro-constitutionalism which has adapted its judicial-political structure to meet the guid-
ing principles of national democratic constitutionalism. Already, as Ortega stated in the 
De Europa Mediato Quedam, there exists an inveterate European society which only 
lacks the mantle of a continental ultra-nation, since Europe is characterised by a desire to 
overcome the limitations of national units. However, after an initial illusion of euphoria, 
the construction of Europe seems to be losing devotees. Europe has lost the moral high 
ground and seems to be advancing without a clear objective and under the shadow of 
dissension. Perhaps, this is due to the elitist character of this project, where only the po-
litical and financial aristocracy, and eurocrats of high standing seem to take advantage, 
and where ordinary people are passive spectators. In this light Maastricht and Amsterdam 
were the anti-European vision of yesteryear for our continent. Thus, what is required is a 
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more legitimate and democratic Union, which can only be achieved with strong popular 
support, given that anything built on a base of arrogance and contempt of the populace 
will inevitably collapse. The enlightened despotism with which Europe was built, with an 
almost exclusive inter-governmental presence, must give way to the regional, national, 
and European parliaments and end the imbalance between institutions, the opacity, inter-
governmental secrecy, confidentiality, the impenetrable character of the debating system 
and the taking of decisions at a European level. There is an urgent need to demystify and 
clarify what happens at Brussels. The task is, therefore, to bring to an end the lack of 
democracy of Maastricht, since Europe is being formed from neither a close relationship 
between its peoples, nor on the basis of decisions taken close to the citizens, as pro-
claimed in article A of the Treaty on European Union. In Brussels we are consolidating a 
bureaucratic Saturn about to eat our children. 
To a unified economic power there is an unavoidable need for a political capacity 
for control and to execute the desires of its citizens. One should not think of Europe as a 
natural and inevitable reality. Europe, by the will of its members, should be ruled by fre-
quent plebiscites, this is the basis of a common future and a liberating constructive desire. 
The evolutionary process towards a political Union based on the principle of the division 
of powers in the manner of democratic countries and the division of responsibilities 
needed to foment the supranational unit has an uncertain future; since it does not agree 
with the institutional structure of national parliamentary systems where each preserves its 
sovereignty. The process of reform of the Treaty of the Union, through the Inter-
Governmental Conference in 1996 (IGC-96), tried to fulfill a crucial objective: it was to 
improve the functioning of the European Union, as well as its efficiency and transpar-
ency, simplifying and bringing nearer to the citizen and his priorities the process of deci-
sion-making in the European area, and adapting the institutional structure for future 
eastern expansion. The objective was eastern enlargement without converting the EU into 
a simple forum for inter-governmental co-operation among nations forming a free trade 
area. The objective was to reform the common policies and prepare public opinion for a 
more unified approach in the new areas such as crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigra-
tion, organised crime and international fraud. Despite this, the results of the discussions in 
the Reflection Group, a guidance group of national renowned experts whose task was to 
prepare the negotiations for the IGC-96 instituted at the Corfu Summit, only served to 
make clear the differing concepts of European construction held by each country, and to 
consolidate a political-federal centralist view which conceals the supremacy of German 
interests in the integration proposals. The major difficulty in achieving a European politi-
cal Union is that democracy and the legitimacy of a government in a society form a deli-
cate web where each element is a vital support to the rest, making the creation of a federal 
multi-national and multilingual nation an uncertainty. 
It is absurd to warn that the consolidated and delicate equilibrium of European in-
stitutions, which were originally products of the creation of the Union, and which have 
enabled it to function with reasonable efficacy, should be changed to make room for the 
new members, thereby affirming that there exists a critical level or number of members at 
which the Union needs substantial changes in its institutions, as was agreed at the meet-
ing of the European Council in Lisbon. At this meeting, it was agreed that prior to any 
expansion of Europe, there was a requirement for a radical change in the structure, insti-
tutions and common policies of the European Community to rebalance the internal power 
structures and eliminate the illegality underlying the institutional structure of the EU from 
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its beginnings. This was an unjust and perverse declaration, if we take into account that 
for more than four decades, the criticisms of lack of institutional democracy were ig-
nored, despite Europe being described as a community of rights with its constitutional 
rules defined by the founding treaties and the later amendments. It was stated that the 
Community structure was in no condition to take in the Central and Eastern European 
countries, because its structure had reached the limit of its capacity, although the real 
reason was that formerly this mattered less because of the more or less economic, politi-
cal, cultural and social homogeneity. 
In this way, the continuous and delicate technical complications, both legal and po-
litical, which crop up in any European summit when it comes to the question of the re-
form of the European institutions should be seen either as a strategy to transfer power to 
where it really belongs, or as an attempt to gain time and delay as long as possible the 
widening eastwards. At the IGC-96, it was proposed to end the perverse system of una-
nimity which paralysed the Union, to break the traditional unacceptable balance between 
large and small countries in the weighting of voting power in the Council of Ministers, 
and to adjust the final number of national commissioners, as irrevocable conditions for 
any eastern expansion. However, for forty years this disproportionate over-representation 
of the smaller countries in the institutions, of the fields ruled by unanimity, and the exces-
sively high number of commissioners, curiously worked, survived and functioned right 
up until the applications to join from the south and east of Europe. But now it is claimed 
that this reform is fundamental because on it will depend the capacity and the resulting 
legislation of the Union, and because if not, we would see the Lilliputians overrun the 
Gullivers. Now, the difficult challenge of applying Monstesquie’s tripartite model to the 
Community’s organic structure is unavoidable. 
Just after the tortuous ratification of the Treaty on European Union, the complex 
IGC-96 started, in order to be able to accept the new and poorer candidates, with their 
differing political histories and with interests and priorities of very different and often 
antagonistic characters. The paralysis and clogging up of the institutional system and the 
decision-making in Europe must not be seen as due to the eastern expansion of the EU, 
but rather as a consequence of the obsolescence of the recently created TEU, which after 
various crucial events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the Soviet Empire, did not 
know how and did not have time to adapt to the new geopolitical context of Europe. This 
disorder has brought to the surface growing discrepancies and disputes among the mem-
ber states in the fight for their own national interests. The problem of Europe is deeper 
than the simple institutional reform required to allow further enlargement. The institu-
tions are important, but if reforms are not initiated to win the spirit and hopes of Euro-
pean citizens, these reforms will be meaningless and the project will die slowly from 
within. 
3. The Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam and the Eastern Enlargement 
With these ideas in mind, it is important at this point to analyse what the Treaty of Am-
sterdam, following the legal institutional reform negotiated in the IGC-96, has meant for 
the challenge to Europe, its eastern enlargement, and for the crusade against the political-
institutional illegality from which it suffers. To be able to analyse the effectiveness of the 
IGC-96, formalised by the approval of the new Treaty of Amsterdam in June 1997 by the 
heads of state and governments of the fifteen member states, we must judge just how far 
the proposals of the reflection group, which aimed at pin-pointing the institutional re-
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forms needed to enable the Union to expand both south- and eastwards, were approved. It 
is necessary since at the European Council in Essen in December 1994, it was stated that 
the IGC-96´s principal mission was to eliminate the institutional barriers for eastern en-
largement, and to incorporate into the EU institutional scheme a functioning structure of 
checks and balances demonstrating its political legitimacy. 
Firstly, it is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the institutional reforms ap-
proved in favour of the European Parliament (EP). This task was, without doubt, the real 
priority of the institutional reform intended to promote the democratic legitimacy of 
Europe by putting an end to the European Parliament’s regulatory weakness in the Euro-
pean decision-making process. This is because the process of integration is based on the 
superimposition of the Community law over the rights of the member states, under the 
banner of supranationality, and because the weak attempts of previous Treaties to elimi-
nate these delegitimising defects were insufficient. In this respect, the star novelties of the 
Treaty of the Union, considered as the life-jacket for the lack of European democracy, 
were, on the one hand, the legislative co-decision procedure, found in article 189B of the 
Treaty, and on the other, that the legislative initiative ceased to be a prerogative of the 
Commission, since the Strasbourg Assembly was authorised to request the managing 
organisation to prepare proposals for the carrying out of the Treaty. However, when ana-
lysing them in depth we find that they are not so life-saving. On the one hand, this proc-
ess of regulatory co-decision, extraordinarily complex with triple readings which 
substitutes in many fields for the former co-operation procedure, firstly increases its par-
ticipation in legislation by conferring the power to veto new legislation together with the 
Council of Ministers in fourteen new areas of regulation, such as the harmonisation of the 
internal market, freedom of movement for labour, environmental protection, the pluri-
annual plan of research and development, and so on. However this co-legislative process 
has little importance for several reasons. Firstly, the Council keeps the agenda-setting 
power when proposing the final text to the European Parliament following the concilia-
tion committee. Secondly, the Commission is a much weaker actor under co-decision 
compared with the previous co-operation procedure. And finally, as with most of the sub-
jects foreseen for its study, the single market, had been concluded, at least in theory, by 
the beginning of 1992, just before the Treaty took effect. On the other hand, the same 
inefficiency can be said about the second innovation of the Treaty, since if the Commis-
sion ignores a proposed initiative in favour of the Parliament, it cannot denounce the 
Commission to the European Court of Justice. Then came the Amsterdam Summit in 
1997, where the European Parliament achieved a better position in the European suprana-
tional institutional framework, as it was decided that in the future it will have a maximum 
of 700 EMPs, independent of the number of member states that join. Moreover, the areas 
of policy where the EP has legislative powers was increased, the process of co-decision 
was simplified by the elimination of the third reading, and the areas of its application 
were extended and widened to include social policy, transport, the fight against fraud in 
the budget of the EU, incentives for employment, statistics, the establishment of an inde-
pendent data protection agency, equal opportunities, cooperation between customs, public 
health and interventions and principles to foment transparency and openness in the Euro-
pean institutions. 
On this first point, despite these apparent improvements in the participation of the 
EP together with the Council in the legislative process, they were in fact ridiculous and 
insufficient. This criticism is not only due to the EP’s small area of participation in the 
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co-decision procedure, and that it can only exercise this regulatory power through a veto 
of the Council’s legislation, all of which leads to a major log-jam, but also because these 
timid improvements in favour of the EP could be countered by the introduction through 
the TEU of up to twenty regulatory procedures and numerous voting systems. This new 
decision-making system based on a greater complexity and disfunctionality further in-
creases its distancing from the European citizen and goes against the object of the exer-
cise, a greater efficiency, transparency and democracy to reinforce the imbalance in the 
national democratic parliaments. These reforms only served to convert the Community 
regulatory process into an authentic procedure maze that reinforces the popular image of 
the EU as a technocratic fortress which confuses, deceives and hounds the European citi-
zen. More democracy in the workings of the Union, as was attempted in the TEU with the 
co-decision procedure, the principle of subsidiarity, the European Ombudsman, the EP 
temporary investigation commissions, or publication in the EEC official bulletin, is not 
enough, when it comes at the expense of transparency and simplification, and severely 
complicating the decision-making process. An objective seen crucial and fundamental to 
the Community is to be open to public debate, more relevant and comprehensible in the 
actions of its institutions, and with the European legislation closer to the European public, 
as officially proposed at the European summit in Birmingham on 16 October 1992. Only 
by bringing nearer to the people this process of deliberation and decision-making, can one 
say that there is efficiency and democracy in the heart of the EU. The EU does not need 
more powers, as it intends, it needs more parliamentary democracy and greater functional 
transparency. It needs a new institutional balance so as to be able to act with efficiency 
and with democracy in its decisions. 
In second place, there came the institutional reforms introduced in favour of the 
European Commission and aimed at compensating for the regulatory supremacy of the 
Council of Ministers. On the one hand, to build a truly democratic institutional Europe, 
the Commission should play the part of the executive organ of the EU government, under 
the control of the legislative authority, as the guarantor of the working and development 
of the common market, and of the application and implementation of policy in the 
framework of the Community. A body of non-elected bureaucrats held up as the guaran-
tee of the right of initiative together with the EP, in defence of the Treaties and as the 
executor of the new pillars of the Treaty of Maastricht. To achieve this within the IGC-
96, and confronted by the priority of the institutional reform to facilitate and allow the 
eastwards expansion of the Union and to avoid this making even worse the complexity, 
opacity, inefficiency and illegitimacy of the decision-making process, several reforms 
were proposed affecting the European Commission. Firstly, there was the need to reduce 
the excessive centralised bureaucracy, to avoid changing the status quo in relations be-
tween member states, and to guarantee efficient operation before the proposed enlarge-
ment of the EU by reducing the number of commissioners, or by differentiating between 
full and associate members given the supposed independent character of the nationality of 
its members. Secondly, the Commission, and its commissioners were to be individually 
and politically responsible to the EP, which would also control the monopoly it has in the 
legislative structure by setting out from the start the limitations of the programme on 
which the Commission bases its proposals. Thirdly, there was to be a conference includ-
ing the reform of the European Commission in order to avoid the conflict of roles it suf-
fers. 
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On the other hand, the Council of Ministers, an organ which represents the member 
states and made up of national leaders, monopolises and concentrates power, without 
democratic political control, in contrast to what occurs in their national capitals. This 
super-executive, both of national and supranational legislation, whose members do and 
undo, build and demolish, resolve fundamental problems, whom direct and stimulate 
Community action and define the direction of general policy and who possess the su-
preme power, puts in danger the balance of power within Europe. In order to prevent this, 
first, there must be an end to the fact that transparency is relegated to oblivion by the 
incomprehensible secretive formula in its decision-making, which is the Committee Ses-
sion of Permanent Representatives, COREPER. This is a committee that meets to prepare 
the work of the Council and is formed from a group of national civil servants, on the basis 
of co-ordination and coherence, and which takes the majority of the decisions of the 
Council without having them discussed by the Council and unhindered by democratic 
control. Secondly, a change in the voting system on the Council is required, to reduce the 
subjects that require the unanimity rule, which threatens to paralyse the life and working 
of the EU, and which gives priority to state sovereignty over that of the citizens. It is nec-
essary to extend the qualified majority voting system, even at the risk of allowing the 
perverse game of block voting and the correlation of forces within the EU, which would 
result from the expansion of the EU, as the veto enables a minority to play the balance of 
power between states. Thirdly, it is urgent that the system of weighting given to the votes 
in the Council of Ministers is changed to give it greater democracy and relation to the 
population so as to make the EU more efficient, democratic, and to guarantee a greater 
voting balance between large and small member states. And finally, as was stated before, 
the Council should share with the EP the legislative power or give greater importance to 
the national parliaments, carrying out procedures of pre-consultation in the national par-
liaments prior to the vote in Council, so that its actions at an European level would have 
the immediate political approval of European public opinion. 
Nevertheless, at the Amsterdam Summit in June 1997, as far as the proposals for 
the reform of the functioning of the European Commission and of the Council of Minis-
ters is concerned, an agreement was reached to block and postpone any debate and deci-
sion on these questions because of the entrenchment of the different attitudes with the 
larger member nations in opposition to the smaller ones over the numbers of commis-
sioners, over the rule of qualified majority voting, and with regard to the weight of votes 
in the heart of the Council of Ministers. Given the impossibility of reaching an agreement 
on the main objective of the conference, which was to agree the new institutional rules to 
allow the eastern and southern expansion of the Union, surprisingly, it was decided that 
there was no need for a new debate, if in the first round of expansion there were not more 
than five new members. The larger nations such as Germany, France, Italy, United King-
dom and Spain, led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, tried to compensate for the loss of a 
commissioner, to keep the final number at twenty, one per nation, in exchange for more 
power in the votes in the Council of Ministers, that is, in exchange for becoming guardi-
ans of the rule of unanimity. Meanwhile, the smaller countries, led by expert and aggres-
sive Belgian Prime Minister, Jean-Luc Dehaen, refused to cede on the weighting of votes 
in the Council unless the system of qualified majority voting was extended to new areas 
such as research and development, culture, industry, and so on, in opposition to the una-
nimity defended tooth and nail by Germany. Only a document of intent was obtained, by 
virtue of which the larger states agreed to accept the loss of one of their existing commis-
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sioners, in favour of the new members, except Spain who demanded as a condition of her 
approval the equalising of the power of its vote with that of the ‘big four’, and the smaller 
countries accepted the need for a revision of the weighting of votes in the Council to take 
into account the population factor, and as a result the ‘double majority’ began to be talked 
about. And finally, only a modest advance was reached towards the extension of the sys-
tem of qualified majority voting in new fields such as the policy of stimulating employ-
ment, social exclusion, equal opportunities between men and women, public health, 
transparency, the fight against fraud, statistics, data protection, the outer regions and the 
start of a new foreign policy. In the final moments of these negotiations, the German gov-
ernment excluded from this extension the policy on the right of movement and residence, 
social security, culture, industry and the environment, and the recognition of professional 
diplomas. 
From all this, it must be concluded that despite this crusade for institutional reform 
intended to advance towards a full legal democratic right in Europe’s institutional web, 
the triangular structure of unequal forces in the European institutions is still maintained. It 
moves us ever closer to an institutional imbalance and a democratic deficit that is evident 
even if it is without demagoguery. It is necessary to involve the founding parliaments of 
national cultures in the mechanisms of decision-making to avoid the process of European 
construction being limited to a process of general deterritorialisation of industries, capital 
and residents, and at the same time to have an EP with more power and credibility, lead-
ing to a more transparent and democratic EU, since there is no democracy without dia-
logue and no transparency without a representative institution near and open to the people 
and their problems. As Maurice Duverger stated, “the constituent power of Europe is at 
once absurd, anti-democratic and inefficient. It is absurd at present because its decisions 
are carried out through diplomatic negotiations between member states. It is anti-
democratic because the elected representatives of the people do not participate, except at 
the end of the process through block votes difficult to refuse. And at the same time, it is 
inefficient since it only needs the refusal of one state to block everything, contrary to the 
rules adopted in the great world confederations such as Switzerland and the United 
States”. We must avoid the co-existence of the two working systems of governance, 
communal and inter-governmental, to prevent a problem of lack of coherence and har-
mony between the different pillars of the European political framework for decision-
making in Europe. In this sense, the institutional reform should enlarge and intensify the 
legal controls and quality of these institutional decisions. This shift in favour of the EU 
exposes the massive problem of legality and legitimacy: the political implications of the 
European states becoming secondary elements of federal power. 
4. The Institutional Reform and the Eastern Enlargement 
It is important to analyse how this institutional reform paralysis of Europe, due to differ-
ences between the fifteen, places in danger the true challenge to the Union which the 
eastern enlargement represents, as Jacques Santer warned on 18 September 1996 at the 
EP, and as proved at the Amsterdam Summit which led to an increasingly nationalist 
view of Europe. The risk of disagreement between the member states over the details of 
the process of institutional reform and Community policy to enable the acceptance of the 
Central and Eastern European countries into the EU, could block or paralyse the process 
of widening. It could convert the political and economic enthusiasm in favour of en-
largement, thereby creating stability and security in the whole continent, into defensive 
Czech Sociological Review, VII, (1/1999) 
100 
nationalist attitudes which take no account of the enormous economic, political and secu-
rity benefits for the member states and for the candidates for membership. 
Following the initial euphoria over fall of communism, and while the Central and 
Eastern European countries suffered the transitional shock therapy and awaited admit-
tance to the European economic club as a way of relieving the pain of transition, the EU 
and its member states became profoundly introspective about the project of integration 
itself, relegating the Community interest below their own national interests. Europe is 
much too interested, preoccupied, and self-centered in its own objectives and internal 
problems and is not paying sufficient attention to the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, thus endangering political, economic and social stability within these societies and 
the emerging regional markets they represent. This European introspection towards the 
profound integration process, consolidated by the unification of Germany, the creation of 
the European Economic Area signed on the 2 May 1991, the establishment of the single 
market in 1992, the ratification of the TEU, the negotiations for the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
the process of Monetary Union, and finally the Agenda 2000, has been the escape valve 
of distraction from the true challenge to the EU, which is the enlargement. A challenge 
that must be considered as the moral obligation of the West, given the pain of transition 
in the return to Europe. Despite the moral and political obligation to take in the former 
communist bloc, the priority is to put our own European house in order and to carry on 
with the in-depth integration by the institutional reform set out in the IGC-96. The prior-
ity is to preserve the achievements of the Union and avoid a wilting of the communal 
spirit. A European attitude that reinforces the principle of exclusivity and the image of the 
EU as a besieged fortress devalues the European tradition of hospitality, solidarity and 
generosity. 
This delaying and obstructionist strategy ahead of the challenge of EU enlargement 
has been carried out with an obsessive tendency to overestimate the cost and danger of 
the eastern expansion of the EU. The studies and analysis of cost and benefits lay bare the 
animosity to the enlargement proposal, based on fears of an institutional imbalance and 
decision-making inefficiency which would be even more difficult for negotiations be-
cause of having to accommodate different interests and making it more difficult to arrive 
at definition of common European positions. But the clearest example of this new Euro-
pean attitude is the fact that the Union has opted for an overloaded agenda of work for the 
coming years, which threatens to hold up the project of enlargement to the East. The sin-
gle European currency, the negotiations for budgetary proposals for the seven-year Euro-
pean budget 2000-2006, the reform of the great common policies such as the Common 
Agricultural Policy, the cohesion funds, the structural funds, the institutional reforms 
required to face the problems of the existing balance and democratic legitimacy, and so 
on, can all lead to the failure of the enlargement, to its delay or postponement. The over-
load of obligations all requiring a consensus on the model of European integration to be 
used, one which at present does not exist, threatens to turn expansion into a mere public 
gesture of little impact. This European introspection has been moulded very clearly in the 
successive European summits centered on the same internal questions repeated again and 
again, without any conclusive results, showing an egotistical vision of Europe. It is the 
product of the irremediable decadence of the European construction diluted in an atmos-
phere of indecision and in a mire that surrounds the decision-taking process, where the 
question of the enlargement is avoided for fear of the economic and political sacrifices, 
engendered by the proliferation of heterogeneous national visions of Europe, built on 
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differing interests and priorities. An unmanageable Europe from a political standpoint. 
One clear and recent example of this was at the European Council summit in Cardiff. In 
this summit, the triumphalist announcements of a new integrationalist momentum, fol-
lowing the approval of the Euro, met with clear signs of division. It was a summit at the 
lowest common denominator and which endangered the consensus, unity and enthusiasm 
required to proceed towards the challenge of the enlargement. This bickering over the 
narrowest of national interests, this disparity in integrationist philosophies among the 
member states, and this overload of future reforms for the EU widening heralded the first 
confrontation between member states, especially Spain and Germany, over the first pro-
posals for maintaining the maximum contribution at 1.27% of GDP, the creation of a fifth 
resource related to the relative wealth of each country, over the reform of the system of 
financing the European budget, on the new weighting of votes in the Council of Minis-
ters, on the number of national commissioners in this body, and so forth. Controversies 
that meant that the discussion of the crucial matters of the enlargement had to be put off 
again until the recent extraordinary summit held in March of 1999 in Berlin, that is, only 
after the German legislative general elections and the complete process of ratification of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. But once more, at this Berlin summit a new split appeared be-
tween the cohesion countries, led by the EP, and the so called ‘group of four’ (Austria, 
Germany, Holland and Finland), led by the European Commission, over the reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy and the structural and cohesion funds, which blocked pro-
gression the expected substantial reforms of these common policies to make possible the 
eastern enlargement. 
To conclude it should be asserted that the EU cannot close in on itself, pleased with 
itself, with its prosperity, proud of its magnificent history and its present security, since 
this would lead to a dead end, to the refusal to contribute to the progress of human his-
tory. We urgently need an Europe which is bigger, with no fear of changes in its strategic 
center of gravity nor the adoption of positions be they central, northern or southern. We 
should not be pleased with membership for mere economic and commercial logic, as 
occurred with the United Kingdom and Denmark in the 1970s, neither for the logic of a 
country redefining its power and influence with its voice in the Community and interna-
tional institutions, as occurred with the Nordics and Austria. Uppermost should be the 
logic of the guarantee of political stability, as well as for communing with the interna-
tional community to definitely consolidate a return to the millennial, foundational, de-
mocratic tradition and to forget fears from the recent past. There will be an arduous and 
complex process of negotiations for the new CEE countries with very clear advantages 
for the EU and its members, while the applicants will be in a very weak negotiation posi-
tion that will force them to make difficult concessions when dealing with crucial sectors 
of their economies; there will be tough requirements and long transition periods. The 
most important challenge in the process of the European integration is to avoid a cold and 
unconcerned cost-benefit analysis on the enlargement by each one of the member states, 
and to design the right strategy of approximation to guarantee the democratic consolida-
tion of these societies of Central and Eastern Europe, because that, at the same time, will 
guarantee the EU’s own security and prosperity. 
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